Capitalism is inherently crisis-ridden, but shows little sign of exhausting itself. It continues to develop new ways of reinvigorating itself and generating economic returns for capital. Globalisation is considered to be the most advanced phase of capitalism. The Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) are an integral part of globalisation. They facilitate growing mobility of finance by facilitating no/low tax, no/low regulation, secrecy and anonymity to enable footloose capital to roam the world. Their policies play a key role in tax avoidance/evasion, money laundering, flight of capital, degradation of regulation, instability and economic underdevelopment, and have serious consequences for people everywhere. Professional intermediaries, such as accountants and lawyers, play a key role in the development and expansion of OFCs. Despite the veneer of liberal democracy, some OFCs are captured by the finance industry and advance the interests of financial capital. Many OFCs are nurtured and protected by leading Western hegemons with developed capital and financial markets. This paper encourages scholars to study the operations, functions, policies and politics of OFCs by drawing attention to their significance and impact on societies.
INTRODUCTION
Capitalism is a crisis-ridden, but a dynamic economic, social and political system (O'Connor, 1987) . Far from exhausting itself, it continues to develop new and novel ways of reinvigorating itself and generating returns for capital. 'Globalization' is considered to be the most advanced phase of capitalism (for a review see Waters, 1995) . Whilst scholars disagree about its extent, significance and direction, there is considerable agreement that relatively easy mobility of finance across porous territorial boundaries, with the aid of information technologies, is central to the processes associated with contemporary forms of capitalism (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997) . Offshore Finance Centres (OFCs; also known as tax havens) play a key role in facilitating growing mobility of finance and shaping complex webs of interactions and relationships involving the nation-states, multinational corporations, a wealthy elite and ordinary citizens (Hampton, 1996; Hampton and Abbott, 1999; Picciotto, 1999; Hampton and Christensen, 2002) .
Since the 1980s, the number of OFCs has doubled from about 30 to more than 60 1 .
Most (but not all) are sparsely populated small island states, or enclaves in Europe 2 , the Americas 3 , Indian Ocean 4 and Australasia 5 (see Financial Stability Forum, 2000; International Monetary Fund, 2000) . Many are British Crown Dependencies, or former colonies, and are generally protected by Western hegemons with major capital markets. In the absence of major industries, abundant natural resources, or marginalisation in the world markets, many smaller states have traded their sovereignty to facilitate mobility of capital. The OFCs are characterised as jurisdictions that attract a high level of non-resident financial activity. These include, to a varying degree, low/zero taxes on business or investment income, no withholding 1 The exact number depends upon definitions (for some issues see Blum, 1994; Doggart, 1997; Diamond and Diamond, 1998; Musalem and Luca, 1999) 2 For example, Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Malta and Monaco. 3 For example, Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles and Turks and Caicos. 4 For example, Mauritius and Seychelles. 5 For example, Cook Islands, Nauru, Marshall Islands.
taxes, light and flexible incorporation and licensing regimes, light and flexible regulatory regimes and flexible use of trusts and other special corporate vehicles.
Corporations and financial institutions can trade without having any physical presence. Their affairs are protected by strictly enforced secrecy and anonymity laws (Financial Stability Forum, 2000; International Monetary Fund, 2000) . In OFCs, the volume of non-resident business substantially exceeds the volume of domestic United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1998). The OFCs hold about 50% of all the cross-border assets (IMF, 2000) . Almost one-third of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and half of global monetary stock passes through tax havens at some stage (Oxfam, 2000; Errico and Musalem, 1999; Cassard, 1994) . US corporations and a rich elite have deposited some $800 billion in the Cayman Islands alone (or some US$20 million for each person living there), representing nearly 20% of all the bank deposits in the USA 8 . The OFCs are hosts to some US$6 trillion of wealth (UK Home Office, 1998), nearly ten times the value of all companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Much of the money is booked through shell companies, which conceal the destination of cash and the identity of its true owners. 6 The term 'offshore' is not necessarily restricted to tiny or remote islands. It can also be applied to any location (e.g. New Jersey, Delaware, City of London) that seeks to attract capital from non-residents by promising low/no taxes, low regulation, secrecy and confidentiality. 7 In offshore locations banks are generally exempt from "reserve requirements, banks transactions are mostly tax-exempt, or treated under a favourable fiscal regime, and they are fee of interest and exchange rate restrictions. Moreover, in many cases, offshore banks are exempt from regulatory scrutiny with respect to liquidity or capital adequacy. Information disclosure is also low" (Errico and Musalem, 1999, p. 6) 8 Evidence to the US Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on 18 July
The activities of offshore financial centres enable capital to increase its rate of return, but also have major economic, social and political consequences for people in other jurisdictions. They are considered to be a threat to the global financial system because of a "greater leeway for balance sheet management, granted by favourable regulatory frameworks in OFCs, makes offshore banks potentially more vulnerable than onshore banks to solvency and foreign exchange risk" (Errico and Musalem, 1999, p. 4) . In the words of Hutton and Giddens (2000) , "They distort the global economy, allow the rich to avoid taxation and also help authoritarian regimes. So many dire political leaders and oligarchies have bled their countries dry by siphoning off funds abroad.
Tax havens, countries with anonymous bank accounts and so forth are deeply implicated in this" (page 38). The OFCs have "undermined national governments' abilities to impose higher taxes both on individuals and companies, has facilitated money laundering, and other illegal activities, and has weakened the power of both national and international supervisory bodies to regulate the financial system" (Hampton, 1996, p. 2 ; also see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998).
The OFCs offer a window for studying contemporary forms of capitalism and globalisation. Their policies renew dynamism of capitalism but also have consequences for distribution of wealth, jobs and development of social infrastructure in other jurisdictions. This paper is organised into three further sections. The first section draws attention to the operations and policies of OFCs that facilitate tax avoidance, economic underdevelopment and financial crime. The policies of OFCs raise questions about their governance, local politics and regulation. Therefore, the second section provides a case study relating to Jersey, a UK Crown Dependency, protected by the UK government. It is implicated in numerous episodes of flight of capital, moneylaundering and tax avoidance. It also hired its legislature to enable major accountancy firms to write their own laws on auditor liability (Cousins et al., 1998 (Cousins et al., , 1999 Morris and Stevenson, 1997) . The third section concludes the paper with a summary and discussion. It also suggests ten areas of research to enrich debates about OFCs and globalisation.
2001 (http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/071801_psimorgenthau.htm)
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES IN A GLOBALISED WORLD
The emergence of OFCs has a complex history (Palan, 2002; Doggart, 1997 (Robinson, 1995) . Others (e.g. Liberia, Panama) provided escape from regulation (e.g. for shipping) in various onshore jurisdictions (Carlisle, 1981) . Some emerged because of interstate rivalries and novel interpretations of taxation laws (Picciotto, 1992) . The nation state's attempts to control domestic economy inevitably gives rise to some discontents. In this environment, some smaller states (Liechtenstein, Monaco) have traded their sovereignty to attract and shelter 'hot money' (Robinson, 1995) . Lawyers associated with Mafia drafted the financial legislation of some of the Caribbean havens (Naylor, 1987) . Nevertheless, the emergence and expansion of OFCs is best understood within the dynamics and contradictions of capitalism. The policies pursued by major western states to simultaneously constrain capital (e.g. through domestic regulation) and encourage its global development have created the space for the emergence of the OFCs.
Ever since its inception, capitalism has been a dynamic economic system seeking out new opportunities for making profits. In search of higher economic surpluses, lower costs/taxes, compliant regulation and new markets, capital (aided by numerous agents) roams the world. Nearly 150 years ago, Marx and Engels observed that "The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. ….. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned ….. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products, chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. … All old-fashioned national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes the life and death question for all civilized nations …." (Marx and Engels, 1998, p. 6 ).
In advanced capitalism, the liberal state plays a major role in fostering the conditions for capital accumulation in both the domestic and international spheres. It is dependent upon the revenues (e.g. taxation levied upon wages, profits, expenditure) generated by 'private' capitalist enterprises for its own survival. However, the capitalist economic system (national and global) is marked by an inherent 'crisis.
Therefore, to create confidence in the system, the state is obliged to enact a wide variety of crisis-management processes (e.g. investigate corporate failures/frauds, protect property rights, control crime, regulate/deregulate, impose social obligations)
for the long-term interests of capital (Offe, 1984; Habermas, 1976) . Capital needs and depends upon various forms of state regulation to maintain the conditions of accumulation, to manage crises, to rationalise market excesses, to liberalise domestic economies, and smooth the way for international capital investment at home and abroad.
Domestic politics endeavours to keep capital and economic activity under control, not merely to protect the interests of citizens, but also to facilitate and foster the conditions in which private accumulation can flourish. Such policies, however, do not constrain the globalizing logic of capital. The footloose capital, wherever possible, seeks to gain competitive advantage by conducting business under conditions of confidentiality and secrecy, with minimum public disclosure and accountability, in accommodating jurisdictions that ask few questions but provide political stability.
Such processes are aided by a variety of professionals (e.g. accountants, lawyers) who play a 'creative role' in structuring transactions and strategies to secure optimal economic advantage for capital. Professionals are highly rewarded for constructing new legal ways of avoiding regulation, costs and taxes (McCahery and Picciotto, 1995) . They place novel interpretations upon the fluid concepts of territorial boundaries, legal personality, business entities, residence, domicile, citizenship and nationality to enable capital to escape domestic politics and shelter in favourable offshore jurisdictions (Picciotto, 1999) .
Since the late nineteenth century, under pressure from major corporations and their wealthy owners, nations began to accept the principle that 'flags of convenience' could be granted to ships doing business in other nations (Carlisle, 1981 interpretations to the legal concept of 'residence', the companies and their owners were able to claim exemptions from the UK/USA laws.
The late nineteenth century rulings by British courts had considerable impact on business tax liabilities and the emergence of tax havens (Picciotto, 1992; by Switzerland, which added banking secrecy and the provision of offshore corporations, and "dummy" directors to become a major location for asset protection.
The legal fiction was that the companies were Swiss and thus protected by Swiss laws, but their assets were located in foreign countries and the companies mainly traded with non-residents (Faith, 1982) .
Since the 1920s, wealthy UK, Canadian and US citizens have formed offshore trusts and holding companies in the Bahamas and the Channel Islands to protect their wealth from taxes (Picciotto, 1992 (Picciotto, , 1999 (Hampton, 1996) . Such trends have continued to the present day. After the Second World War, American TNCs assumed a powerful role in exporting capitalism and rebuilding the economies shattered by war. The US government was not keen to permit companies to export capital and stifle the domestic capital markets and investment. Therefore, the investment abroad was often in the form of loans and retained earnings to finance local expansion. The profits of foreign subsidiaries were only subject to US taxes when repatriated as dividends.
Such tax exemptions financed investment abroad and also encouraged companies to develop a creative network of fictitious subsidiaries for minimising tax liabilities at home and abroad (Picciotto, 1999 In the 1960s and 1970s, many US banks formed branches in tax havens to book Eurocurrency loans and avoid US taxes and regulation of capital flows (Hampton, 1996, p. 17) . During the 1960s and the 1970s, the US attempts to regulate capital (for example, by imposing capital controls, cash reserve requirements on demand deposits and capped interest rates on time deposits) played a significant role in emergence of offshore interbank market (Cassard, 1994) . The emulation of similar controls by major industrialised nations further expanded the offshore market ( (Errico and Musalem, 1999, p. 16 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES AND GLOBAL MOBILITY OF CAPITAL

Tax Avoidance
The avoidance of taxes enables capital to raise or maintain its rate of return. Armies of accountants and lawyers, charging £400-£500 an hour, devise tax avoidance and evasion schemes to enable major corporations (and the rich) to avoid UK taxes through nominee companies and offshore trusts. They assist in the setting up and fronting of bank accounts, shell companies and trusts in tax havens. As one tax expert put it, "I have never come across any reason for people to set up an offshore trust other than to avoid UK tax. The people who used them saved very substantial sums"
(The Times, 10 July 2000).
In some OFCs, banks which are no more than "closets with computers" (Financial Some US companies use offshore havens to enact aggressive transfer pricing policies.
A favourite tactic is to over-invoice imports and under-invoice exports, resulting in tax savings of some $53 billion each year (Pak and Zdanowicz, 2002) . Most tax avoidance/evasion schemes involve the use of offshore companies, trusts, artificial transactions and clever financial engineering.
The offshore activities give capitalism new dynamism and generate additional profits, but also leave major social scars. They do not enable elected governments to eradicate poverty, fight environmental degradation, finance education, healthcare, pensions and much needed social infrastructure. Germany is estimated to be losing some US$15 billion in tax revenues annually to undeclared personal savings held in offshore bank accounts The use of offshore tax havens by global corporations is depriving developing countries of some $50 billion of tax revenues each year 17 , large enough to free them from foreign aid, rising debt and poverty. According to Oxfam (2000) "Tax havens provide companies and wealthy individuals with a way to escape their tax obligations.
This limits the capacity of individual countries to raise revenue through taxation, both on their own residents and on foreign-owned capital. This undermines the ability of governments in poor countries to make vital investments in social services and economic infrastructure upon which human welfare and sustainable economic By liberalising their economies, countries also embrace the full effects of tax havens.
Following the collapse of communism, Russia has been encouraged to embrace market capitalism and facilitate movement of capital. For every dollar of inward investment during the 1990s, it lost between ten and twenty dollars to offshore accounts held by a wealthy elite September 1997). In Mexico, the former President's brother has been convicted of taking large bribes from drug traffickers. The proceeds were laundered through banks based in Switzerland. The assets frozen in Switzerland amounted to $132 million.
More accounts were probably held under assumed names (The Economist, 16
December 1995).
Money Laundering
According to the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (1998), "The common denominator in money-laundering and a variety of financial crimes is the enabling machinery that has been created in the financial havens and offshore centres" (p.8). According to law enforcement agencies, "modern economic More than $1.5 trillion a year (roughly equal to the Gross Domestic Product of France) is estimated to be laundered, much of it through tax havens that ask no questions and rarely co-operate with international regulators (Financial Action Task Force, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1998; Mitchell et al., 2002) . This enables some entrepreneurs to avoid regulation, taxes, undermine governments, and weaken the citizen-state contract. The proceeds can also be used to recruit private armies, fund gangsters, prostitution, and narcotics and undermine social order. This inevitably raises questions about the politics, regulation and governance of OFCs. (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002) and has hired out its legislature to accountancy firms to enable them to write their own legislation, shielding them from lawsuits (Cousins et al., 1998 (Cousins et al., , 1999 Mitchell and Sikka, 1999; Morris and Stevenson, 1997) .
JERSEY: A CASE STUDY
A focus upon the governance and regulation in Jersey enables a deeper appreciation of the politics of globalisation, mobility of capital and the kind of political stability that footloose capital so craves. This next section sketches out some aspects of the governance of Jersey.
Jersey: The Island
Jersey is located 14 miles (20 km) from the coast of France and 100 miles (160 km) south of mainland Britain, and is just a forty-five minutes flight from the City of London, a major international financial centre. The island has a population of nearly 87,000 (Jersey Evening Post, 23 October 2001) and a total area of 45 square miles, (9 miles x 5 miles) or 116 km square.
Jersey is neither part of the UK nor a member of the European Union (EU) and is therefore not subject to any British and/or European Union laws. The UK has, however, negotiated a special status to enable Jersey to enjoy favourable trading terms with the EU, but without the commensurate social, economic and political obligations. Since the 1960s, Jersey has actively adopted measures to turn itself into an offshore tax haven (Hampton, 1996) . It is now the home of some 40,000 registered companies (and numerous unregistered trusts), the large majority of which are tax-exempt or subject to special non-resident tax regimes (UK Home Office, 1998). It boasts financial deposits of some £400 billion, but many of the businesses are "brass plate"
operations formed to avoid taxation and regulation in other countries. There is no requirement for companies to publish audited accounts. Jersey has no inheritance or capital gains tax. It offers 20% income tax, but in reality the wealthy can negotiate a far lower effective rate of tax, or devise schemes to avoid any payment . Some "wealthy residents have admitted …. that they have not paid Jersey does not have political parties and the machinery that goes with them. Thus there is no coherent programme of reform, or contestation of government policies.
Individuals seeking to be elected do so as independent candidates rather than as members of political parties though some candidates form mutual alliances. At election times, they are not entitled to equal free access to radio or television, or free 23 In sharp contrast to the legal principles established by the January 1999 House of Lords' judgement in re Pinochet (http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990115/pino01.htm), the Bailiff claims that "there is no risk of bias by his presiding in a prosecution that has been brought by his brother, the 2). Whilst pursuing their business interests, they meet, on average 3-5 days a month.
They are poorly resourced and lack researchers to support them in their efforts to scrutinise the policies of the executive. They could be advised and briefed by pressure groups and new social movements (e.g. environment, trade unions), but pressure groups are not well organised. Campaigners for change are easily ostracised by the ruling elite. Jersey's only newspaper, the Jersey Evening Post (JEP), is owned by a senior member of the government with considerable local economic and political interests. The local radio and television, also finds it easier to follow the official line and rarely subjects the government to critical scrutiny Instead of a Cabinet system of government, Jersey is governed by a Committee 27 The author gave written and oral evidence to the Clothier Committee. 28 They seem to be concerned about the welfare of business. For example, the report notes, "Because of its post-war development as a modern financial services centre, Jersey today has amongst its population an unusually high proportion of well qualified business and professional people. In most cases, the nature and extent of their other commitments would deter them from seeking election to the States, but the more open pattern of policy determination we envisage here would afford them a better opportunity to contribute if they wished to the development of public policy, through the submission of evidence or even as special advisors to Scrutiny Committees" (States of Jersey, 2000, p. 39). 29 As the New York Assistant District Attorney pursuing frauds by the now defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) put it, "My experience with both apparatus to Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young to enable them to write the designer liability laws. A dissenter was 'indefinitely suspended' from parliament whilst another one was persuaded to leave the Island (Cousins et al., 1998; Mitchell and Sikka, 1999) . The European Union Under pressure from the Jersey authorities, the review did not look at the system that facilitates tax avoidance/evasion for footloose capital. It ignored the social costs of Jersey's role as an offshore finance centre, even though the terms of reference mentioned 'economic well-being of the Islands themselves and the United Kingdom'.
The civil service and courts play a crucial role in the drafting, enactment, implementation and enforcement of regulations relating to secrecy and the provision of tax-exempt business vehicles for non-residents. Yet they too were excluded from the inquiry. The UK government gave no undertaking to publish any detailed report, though a Home Office press release stated that "Although this is an internal review, we intend to publish a summary of its main findings" (press release dated 20 January 1998). However, following a widely reported leak 33 , the UK government eventually Jersey and Guernsey has been that it has not been possible for US law enforcement to collect evidence and prosecute crime. In one case we tracked money from the Bahamas through Curacao, New York and London, but the paper trail stopped in Jersey and Guernsey ……. It is unseemly that these British dependencies should be acting as havens for transactions that would not even be protected by Swiss bank secrecy laws 29 " (The Observer, 22 September 1996, p. 19). 30 The investigation also covered the entire Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. 31 The review was carried out by Andrew Edwards, formerly a Director and Deputy Director at the UK Treasury and Chairman of the Whitehall Principal Finance Officers' Committee (UK Home Office Press Release, 20 January 1998). 32 The Jersey establishment normally responds to such external pressures by claiming that the UK is interfering in its internal affairs (Financial Times, 22 January 1999; Morris and Campbell, 1999; Morris and Campbell, 2000) . 33 The report was leaked on the website of the Association for Accountancy & Business Affairs (AABA) and received considerable press coverage (for example, The Guardian, 26 September 1998, p. 1, 14 and 22; Sunday Business, 27 September 1998, p. 6; Financial Times, 12 October 1998, p. 9; Sunday Telegraph, 1 November 1998; Jersey Evening Post, 26 September 1998, p. 1; 5 October 1998, p. 1-2; 6 October published the [Edwards] report (UK Home Office, 1998).
The report 34 (UK Home Office, 1998) contained over 150 proposals for reform and stated that Jersey lacked some basic financial regulation. For example, it did not have independent regulation of the financial sector, a depositor protection scheme, an independent ombudsman to resolve disputes, anti crimes legislation, adequate consumer protection laws, complaints investigation procedures, an ombudsman to adjudicate on complaints and protocols for co-operation with external authorities and much more. Jersey does not require companies to file audited financial information and regards this as a key magnet in attracting footloose international capital. Edwards recommended that "all limited companies … be required to keep audited accounts and to file them publicly, with much abbreviated requirements for small companies"(para 10.10.7). Edwards also applied this principle to asset holding companies, especially
given the high risk that such companies could be exploited as vehicles for money laundering by non-residents (paras 10.10.10 -10.10.11).
With acknowledged financial deposits of some £400 billion, a small unit within the claimed was an independent regulatory body, the Financial Services Commission (FSC). Senator Frank Walker remained its chairman until external pressure forced his 1998, p. 6; The Isle of Man Examiner, 6 October 1998, p.1; Guernsey Evening Press, 6 October 1998, p. 1; Manx Independent, 9 October 1998, p. 5; The Money Laundering Bulletin, October 1998, p. 1 and 4). 34 The report crafted in careful civil service language largely endorsed the status quo. It classified Jersey as in the "top division" of offshore finance centres without making any comment about whether this was good or bad. An open criticism would have acknowledged that Britain had failed to provide good governance of the island, and that the existence of tax haven like Jersey encouraged flight of capital and forced British people to pay higher taxes. The initial leaked version of the report was considerably more critical than the published report but was watered down following behind the scenes lobbying by the Island's politicians and civil servants (Willoughby, 1999; Morris and Campbell, 2000) . It was warmly received by Jersey's ruling establishment. The tentative nature of the report was described by some commentators as "perilously close to a whitewash" (Morris and Campbell, 1999, page 63 Jersey (and many other tax havens) permits the use of nominee directors in respect of companies incorporated elsewhere and thus conceals the identity of the owners.
Edwards suggests a three pronged attack. First, a regime of licensing and supervision applying the criterion that only "fit and proper" persons in terms of integrity, solvency, competence and track record be permitted to act as nominee directors.
Secondly, a Code of Conduct for Directors which would, inter alia, require them to be aware of who owns the company, the nature of its business, its financial position and to have full and up to date information and ensure that the company is not being used for illegal purposes. Thirdly, as a general principle Directors should be obliged to refrain from holding an unreasonable number of Directorships, though no specific ceiling should be set. Annual returns would be required from those providing Directors' services specifying the ownership, place of incorporation and principal activities of the companies they serve as Directors (para 11.2.19).
Jersey's ruling elite was not happy with the proposed reforms and decided to 'cherry pick' 36 . It refused to accept "that all private companies should be required to prepare and publicly file audited accounts" (States of Jersey, 1999, para 3.11.2). In relation to offshore trusts, Edwards essentially endorsed their continued use as vehicles for tax avoidance shrouded in secrecy, and suggested a series of measures designed to safeguard the interests of beneficiaries. Despite this, Jersey claimed that the proposals were based on misconceptions of Jersey law and hence "unnecessary" (States of 35 In anticipation of criticisms from Edwards, Jersey created the independent Financial Services Commission (Financial Services Commission (Jersey) Law 1998). A commitment was made to hive off the promotional role to a separate distinct body (Jersey Financial Services Commission, 1998) . A separate enforcement department has been created within the Commission entrusted with responsibility for all enforcement matters and co-operating with overseas' regulators (Jersey Financial Services Commission, 1999) . But the FSC is full of political appointees. The majority of Jersey based representatives are composed of the retired Chief Adviser to the Jersey Government, with the remaining three drawn from the Island's legal, accountancy and banking "pinstripe" infrastructure, which earns its living off and is consequently in a client relationship with the offshore finance industry. 36 Through discussions with the UK officials, Jersey was made well aware of the changes needed to secure removal from the OECD blacklist and started work on some aspects before the publications of the Edwards Report. When the report was published, it was able to claim that it was already voluntarily introducing changes. jurisdictions and the quality of its regulation (Pratt, 2000) . At the same time, the influential US Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has designated Jersey a jurisdiction of "primary concern". This means "the volume of money laundering continues to be substantial and continued vigilance and effective enforcement by the government is essential to successfully combat money laundering" (US Department of State, 1999) , albeit tempered by the Bureau's praise by stating that "Jersey has developed a comprehensive money-laundering regime and has clearly demonstrated the political will to ensure that its financial institutions and services industry is not used to launder money. Jersey's key to success in preventing its offshore financial sector from being used to launder money will be in the continued force with which it implements the new legislation and regulations" (US Department of State, 2000) . 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Capitalism is crisis prone, but remains a dynamic system. Far from exhausting itself, it continues to find new ways of reinvigorating itself and earning returns for capital.
Globalisation and contradictory economic policies pursued by the nations-states have released capital from the prison of national territorial boundaries. Offshore tax havens play a key role in the global mobility of capital through competitive deregulation.
They provide secrecy, low/no tax and low regulation to enable capital to roam the world. Accountants, lawyers and bankers play a key part in facilitating a creative use of the concepts of 'residence', 'domicile', 'jurisdiction' and legal personality. Nation By registering in tax havens, multinationals are able to reduce their tax bills/costs, increase their profits/dividends and returns to stockholders. The host country raises some revenues (e.g. through low taxes or registration fees) to finance its local infrastructure. However, the value-added component of a transaction being routed through, for example, the Caymans Islands, does not lie with any wealth creating activity performed there. It nests instead in tax avoidance, or in the secrecy space afforded by routing the transaction through the offshore circuits (Hampton and Christensen, 2002) . The cost of this is borne by citizens in other places. By claiming 38 http://www.citzenworks.org (accessed on 7 December 2002).
'residence' in offshore havens, multinationals do not abandon markets and monopolies in other jurisdictions. Often money itself does not physically move to tax havens, it is merely booked there. They merely secure "fictional" residences in offshore places (Roberts, 1994) matter whether it is more efficient or innovative than its multinational rival, will be competing on an uneven field. The logic of this uneven competition requires either that all businesses ultimately move offshore in order to compete on a level basis, or that onshore tax authorities adjust their tax policies to place a greater burden on other factors of production (particularly labour) and onto consumption (Christensen and Hampton, 2000) .
The case of Jersey shows that the OFCs are protected by major Western hegemons.
The veneer of liberal democracy helps to gloss over its 'capture' and dependence upon financial capital. The close relationship between big business and politics helps to provide the suffocating political stability that capital so craves. The fiction is that
Jersey is an autonomous island state that is neither part of the UK, nor the EU.
However, this in/out status is full of ambiguities. The UK retains powers to launch investigations into Jersey's affairs, appoint its head of state and also negotiate lucrative commercial arrangements for its benefit with the EU. In recent years, the UK government has sought to pressurise Jersey to reform its system of financial regulation and present a respectable face to the world (UK Home Office, 1998) rather than curb its role in facilitating flight of capital and global tax avoidance. (Cousins et al, 1998; Mitchell et al, 2002) . The contradictions and tensions call for a review of the theories of the state. 4. Financial intermediaries (e.g. accountants, lawyers, bankers) play a key in constructing 'fictional spaces' of tax havens, exploiting tax loopholes and structuring transactions so as to avoid taxes and regulations. Yet little is known about how these professional intermediaries operate in offshore jurisdictions even though they indulge in dubious practices (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002) . It would be helpful to document the role of accountancy firms in oiling the wheels of tax havens.
What is the impact of OFCs on developing countries? A report by Oxfam showed
that the amount of tax avoided by major corporations in developing countries is roughly equivalent to foreign aid received by them. As a condition of financial support/loans, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund demand that developing countries engage in 'structural adjustments', devalue their currencies and curtail subsidies for farming, food and other essentials. Yet these institutions have failed to examine the impact of tax havens and major corporations in stifling economic development of emerging economies.
6. What is the extent of tax avoidance by companies? It would be useful to develop models that estimate it. Another approach would be to examine published financial statements of global corporations and scrutinise the instances when they pay taxes at less than the going rate of corporate taxes. Such information could become a powerful catalyst for debates about wealth transfer, the corrosive effects of globalisation and provide counter information whenever governments claim to be unable to finance healthcare, education and public services. 
